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The radical shift in development strategy in Latin America to market-based reforms was a 
product of the 1982 debt crisis. In its aftermath Latin American economies stopped growing for 
most of the 1980s. Persistent balance of payments deficits, aggravated by fixed exchange rates, 
were the proximate causes of ten years of economic stagnation. Protection for domestic 
manufacturers was a structural factor that prevented countries from developing export industries 
able to finance growing volumes of imports. Unaccountable governments and political instability 
in many countries also were underlying structural weaknesses that contributed to the debt 
debacle. Because governments found it easier to contract debts from international banks (who 
were more than willing to recycle petrol dollars) than to build a political consensus in favor of 
raising chronically low tax rates, most countries of the region piled up public debts in foreign 
currencies (at unfixed interest rates). These debts became unsustainable by the 1980s.
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Kurt Weyland's The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies analyzes why Latin 
American presidents succeeded or failed to enact first generation structural reforms, policies 
aimed at restoring macroeconomic health in the 1980s. In general, first generation reforms 
focused on reducing inflation and reigniting economic growth. Weyland not only offers an 
explanation for why radical neoliberal experiments took hold or did not take hold in Argentina, 
Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela, but also challenges the use of rational choice to make sense of Latin 
American politics. Jorge Dominguez and Michael Shifter's collection of essays, Constructing 
Democratic Governance, examines the political impact of market-based reforms in the region. 
Thematic and country-specific chapters analyze how well (or badly) political systems are 
building the political consensus to promote democratic consolidation. 
 
Institutional design issues were relevant for effective social programs and second generation 
structural reforms—the strengthening of courts and regulatory bodies that improve economic 
competitiveness. 
2
 In Retiring the State, Raul Madrid analyzes why the Chilean government 
privatized its social security systems while others did not. Dispostion of old age pensions not 
only has fiscal implications, but also raises questions about how states should meet social 
obligations and be restructured to improve efficiency and competitiveness. The articles in 
Democratic Accountability in Latin America, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher 
Welna, discuss the effectiveness of horizontal accountability in select countries of the region. 
 
These books do little to suggest that, outside of a few cases, citizens and the state are 
collaborating to produce effective democratic governance or that the region is on its way to 
becoming economically developed. While virtually all Latin Americans live in formally 
democratic systems, most have good reasons to complain about the quality of their political 
systems.
3
 Even by the late 1990s, Latinobarometer surveys indicate that less than 40 percent of 
those surveyed were very or partly satisfied with democracy in their countries; only in Costa 
Rica and Uruguay do these percentages exceed 60 percent. In contrast, an average of 50 percent 
of the citizens of the fifteen countries of the European Union responds that they are very or 
partly satisfied with democracy.
4
 Despite two decades of reforms, development is as elusive as 
ever, even if macroeconomic and political stability now exists in most countries. By the end of 
the twentieth century, the average per capita GDP rate in the region reached about $4,000 (in 
1987 PPP US$), barely doubling in more than fifty years. In the interim, average per capita GDP 
in the developed world has gone from about $5,000 to nearly $14,000.
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For critics of market-based reforms, these less than impressive results prove that development 
does not hinge upon free trade and markets. For neoliberals, unimpressive growth rates mean that 
Latin American societies need to deepen structural reforms. Just when the speed of reforms 
should pick up, however, surveys suggest that public opinion is turning against them.
6
 Whether 
neoliberals or their critics are right, these books suggest that governance—the construction of 
political consensus around short- and long-term goals and of institutions and procedures to 
implement them—suffers from serious ailments, drawbacks that prevent the enactment of the 
institutional and regulatory reforms necessary for democratic legitimacy and economic growth. 
  
It is necessary to start integrating what remain four separate subfields of study: public opinion, 
the political economy of structural reform, democratic governance, and institutional design. Each 
is a core element of what should be the new political economy of the region, one concerned with 
identifying the electoral and institutional constraints to development. Next, it needs to be 
explained why some institutional designs make governments responsive to voters' preferences 
and also build a consensus in favor of structural reform. Particular attention should be paid to 
Weyland's findings (and related work) on why public opinion became skeptical about more 
market-based reforms. More thinking is also necessary about better ways of measuring 
democratic governance, a concept central in measuring the overall effectiveness of political 
systems and in comparing and contrasting political system performance. 
 
First Generation Structural Reforms 
Why did several Latin American presidents liberalize trade, lift price controls, and privatize state 
companies, actions guaranteed to offend powerful interest groups? Why did voters accept the 
pain in some places, but not in others? In The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies, 
Weyland argues that conventional rational choice approaches, based upon expected utility 
calculations, can not answer these questions. The probability of enacting these reforms is low or 
difficult to calculate, even if the political rewards for taming inflation are high. In these 
circumstances, the rational thing may be to do nothing. 
 
Weyland borrows from prospect theory, a set of hypotheses developed by psychologists to 
explain counterintuitive behavior. If rational choice presumes that humans are incessantly 
calculating the risks and rewards of different options, prospect theory assumes that the costs of 
acquiring and processing information are high enough to turn humans into creatures of routines. 
Once they get used to responding to constraints in a certain way, they stick with their behavior, 
even if conditions have changed. In this situation the status quo or "prior option" becomes a 
powerful constraint on the present. If the prior option was well regarded, changes in conditions 
may make decision makers only stubborn defenders of the status quo. 
 
Prospect theory hypothesizes that people react to their environment depending on whether they 
are in the "domain of gains" or the "domain of losses." In the domain of gains, they are risk-
averse. They do not disturb the status quo because they fear the unintended and unknown 
consequences of change. If, however, a decision maker is in the domain of losses, he may 
actually become a risk-taker. If a crisis—defined as a highly probable but uncertain change of the 
status quo—is looming, decision makers may decide to take risks, even huge ones. Curiously, 
they may even become less risk-averse than is rational in an effort to escape from the domain of 
losses. 
 
The Politics of Economic Reform in Fragile Democracies uses these insights to explain the 
failures and successes of market-based reforms. Weyland dissects the decision making of 
Presidents Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina (1989-99, two terms), Fernando Collor de Mello of 
Brazil (1990-92, impeached on corruption charges), Alberto Fujimori of Peru (1990-2000, two 
terms and a presidential coup in 1992), and Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela (1974-79, 1989-
93, two terms). The first three were able to implement drastic reforms because their societies 
were experiencing hyperinflation. (In 1988 the inflation rate in Argentina was 387 percent; in 
Brazil, 1,037 percent; and in Peru, 1,722 percent.) In each case the president was able to use his 
office to build public support for radical economic reforms because enough citizens also believed 
they were in the domain of losses. In contrast, Perez had to reverse many of these reforms 
because few Venezuelans accepted the president's argument that their country was verging on 
economic crash. While inflation at 29.5 percent in 1988 was not low, it was not spiraling up. To 
his credit, Weyland uses narratives of reform experiences to shed light on expected utility and 
prospect theory approaches. 
 
This book is powerful and provocative. Without abandoning methodological individualism—the 
theoretical stance that decision making must be comprehensible in the light of the tastes, 
preferences, and beliefs of individuals—Weyland offers a psychological and systematic account 
to explain counterintuitive political choices.
7
 In many ways, Weyland's use of prospect theory 
echoes the arguments made by Herbert A. Simon.
8
 Like Weyland's politicians and voters, 
Simon's firms "satisfice," or find a satisfactory way of doing things because incomplete 
information makes it too hard to calculate costs and benefits required by utility maximization. 
 
Focusing on four cases privileges the sort of psychological factors that Weyland finds amenable, 
though the concluding chapter assesses the utility of his approach in a larger sample of cases 
from Africa, eastern Europe, and the rest of Latin America. His case would have been stronger if 
he had analyzed a larger number of cases and figured out how to operationalize difficult-to-
measure concepts. Susan Stokes pursued this strategy in Mandates and Democracy.
9
 By 
examining forty-two elections in fifteen Latin American countries between 1982 and 1995, 
Stokes shows that highly competitive elections and institutionalized party systems discourage 
politicians from implementing neoliberal reforms. Similarly, Eduardo Lora and Mauricio 
Olivera, in a paper using a dataset of aggregate electoral returns, institutional features, and 
economic conditions from seventeen Latin American countries between 1985 and 2002, point 
out that incumbents who push promarket reforms pay high electoral costs, even when such 
reforms improve macroeconomic performance.
10
 Both of these arguments are consistent with 
Weyland's and show how a quantitative research design would have complemented his case 
study approach. 
 
Weyland shows that voters endorsed macroeconomic stabilization if they were in the domain of 
losses. More than 70 percent of those surveyed in Argentina and Brazil endorsed radical 
economic reform. Forty-nine percent of those surveyed in Peru supported shock therapy. 
Presidential approval rates remained in excess of 50 percent in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru even 
after presidents implemented shock therapy. Each of these countries was also suffering from 
hyperinflation, Weyland's principal indicator of whether a society is in the domain of losses. In 
contrast, Weyland's data show that Venezuelans turned against President Pérez's shock therapy 
and did not believe the president's claim that their economic problems would soon worsen. 
Inflation was only 29.5 percent. While these facts are consistent with his argument, it would be 
useful to see the results of individual-level models showing that perceptions of inflation are 
statistically related to support for shock therapy. Whether social class or membership in the 
formal or informal sector mediates this relationship would also shed additional light on 
Weyland's arguments. Arguably, members of the informal sector should be more likely to 
support shock therapy because reducing inflation even while cutting social benefits for the 
formally employed—would be in their interest. 
 
Public opinion is the topic of Marta Lagos's chapter in Constructing Democratic Governance in 
Latin America. She provides a synthesis of Latinobarometer, the region-wide effort to plumb 
public opinion she coordinates.
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 Her central message is that Latin Americans have a low 
opinion of their politicians. They also display low levels of interpersonal trust, which she 
believes limits democratic consolidation. Latin Americans also have the least confidence in 
parties and legislatures; less than an average of 10 percent of the population claim that they have 
"a lot of confidence" in these institutions. Latin Americans have the most confidence in the 
church; on average, about half of the respondents say they have a lot of trust in it. The armed 
forces come in second place with between 15 and 20 percent. The executive and judiciary do 
only marginally better than legislators and parties. 
 
Lagos's psychological approach to public opinion, however, raises more questions than it 
answers. For example, Bolivians and Costa Ricans have the most pessimistic expectations of 
their own and their country's future economic performance, a truly bizarre finding given that 
GDP per capita rates are more than threee times lower in Bolivia than in Costa Rica. Dominguez, 
in his conclusion to Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, also notes that there 
is no explanation why only 55 percent of respondents support democracy in Chile, while, the 
comparable figure in Uraguay is 80 percent. And while all can lament the low level of trust in the 
region, it is not clear that it is a cause of low quality democracy. In a paper she does not cite, 
Edward Mueller and Mitchell Seligson use data from a large number of cases to show that trust 
is more an effect than a cause of democracy.
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Nevertheless, something like Lagos's approach is necessary to make sense of why public opinion 
sometimes supports market-based reforms and sometimes does not. Broadly, this approach also 
emphasizes the theoretical implications of prospect theory. Information asymmetries and 
cognitive biases make for complex judgments that are not always in line with simple, neat 
models of rational behavior. Lagos suggests that expectations and core beliefs have something to 
do with why electorates sometimes trust their elected leaders and sometimes do not. Lora and 
Olivera call for this research agenda in their own effort to show that voters often turn against 
market-based reforms, even when the results improve aggregate economic outcomes and 
welfare, because they reject the allegedly immoral character of these policies.
13
 Public opinion 
research, of which there is too little, needs to help assess these and other claims. These research 
questions are important because the credibility of policy reform in a modern democracy requires 
the electorate's support. Electoral backing is the ultimate binding device for long-term policy 
change in modern democracies. 
 
Discussions of electoral support for structural reform raise questions whether neoliberal reforms 
have been successful. Javier Corrales's chapter in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin 
America suggests that the countries that timidly adopted the neoliberal agenda were the "worst 
performers" as far as economic growth and fiscal deficits are concerned. During the 1990s the 
aggressive reformers— Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru had average annual growth 
rates of 4.48 percent. Intermediate reformers—Brazil and Colombia had average annual growth 
rates of 2.5 percent. Shallow reformers—Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela grew at an average 
annual percent of 2.66. Corrales argues that the neoliberal approach worked best when 
technocrats worked with politicians to strengthen states, especially by increasing bureaucratic 
competence and raising tax revenues.
14 
 
While this argument is good, it is hard to replicate its findings because Corrales does not provide 
criteria for classifying countries in these three categories. Thus, his classification of cases 
involves questionable judgments. Eduardo Lora's structural reform index, a systematic effort to 
compare structural reform efforts cross-nationally and longitudinally in Latin America, suggests 
that Mexico, for example, is not one of the region's aggressive reformers.
15
 Presidents Miguel de 
la Madrid (1982-88) and Carlos Salinas de Gotari (1988-94) radically liberalized international 
trade and privatized many small and money-losing state corporations.
16
 But neither they nor 
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) nor Vicente Fox (2000-6) has been able to reform a forty-year old 
labor code. Nor did they open up the energy sector to private sector investment; a constitutional 
restriction makes Mexico's energy sector the most nationalist in the world. And no one has been 
able to raise chronically low tax rates (approximately I 0 percent of GDP), a long-standing 
neoliberal objective typically requested by multilateral institutions like the World Bank. 
Petroleum exports account for roughly a third of total federal government revenues and leave the 
public oil company with little money for exploration and development. Without private sector 
investment in the energy sector or tax reform (or both), the Mexican state is squandering its oil 
reserves, which are not expected to last beyond fifteen years. Yet in these and other areas 
policymakers have been unable to build the consensus to continue reforming the Mexican 
economic and political system.
17
 Reform stagnation therefore explains why Mexico has always 
stayed below the regional mean on Lora's structural reform index and perhaps why its growth 
rates have not approximated those of Chile, a point that would have strengthened Corrales's own 
core finding. 
 
Democratization and Governance 
In a region where military and civilian regimes have often alternated, the consolidation of 
competitive elections is an achievement. Their consequences are a central preoccupation of 
Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. This collection of articles examines the 
workings of democracy in seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Mexico, Peru, 
and Venezuela) and progress on six issue areas (public opinion, presidentialism and 
representative institutions, market reforms, the military, labor, and women). 
 
There have been very few coups since 1978, a point that Dominguez emphasizes in the 
concluding essay to Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. Between 1978 and 
2003 only one government has fallen because of a military or presidential coup (Fujimori in 
1992 with implicit military support). Most governments have finished their terms in office, 
though 19 percent (fourteen out of seventy-four) of all governments during these years have 
not.
18
 John Carey, in his essay on presidentialism and representative government, observes that 
interbranch conflicts no longer end in military coups.
19
 Since the 1980s failed presidents have 
tendered their resignation before congress. This pattern is in marked contrast with earlier 
decades, when the threat of a military coup was ever present, either because the government (or 
factions therein) was planning to stay in power or because the opposition was conspiring with the 
military to obtain power. Between 1945 and 1982, 38 percent of presidential administrations 
(fifty-one of 133) ended their terms with a coup, while 62 percent (eighty-two of 133) ended 
their terms with an election.
20 
 
As a result of democratization, the military's role in politics has changed. Rut Diamint's chapter 
on the armed forces in Latin America in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America 
notes that the military's presence in society has decreased in most countries. As a share of GDP, 
defense expenditures in Brazil and Colombia since the mid 1980s have increased only from less 
than 2 to 3.2 percent of GDP. On a per capita basis, defense expenditures have increased in these 
societies as well as in Chile and in Mexico. Unfortunately, as Diamint points out, civilian 
authorities of the region have still not developed effective ways of overseeing the military. The 
war on drugs, in fact, has expanded the internal policing functions of the military in many 
countries. All of these factors weaken the rule of law.
21 
 
Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America also puts a spotlight on governance, that 
is, the ability of governments to build consensus to solve fundamental economic and social 
problems. Judging from the essays in this book, only a handful of societies in the region are well 
governed. Most do not have systems of representation that foster accountability. Their 
policymaking is not very transparent. They do not develop a long-term consensus of the public 
interest to guide policymakers. In many cases private interests capture regulatory bodies and rule 
in favor of narrow interests. The rule of law in the region is mixed. This combination is 
depressing and makes citizenries who are often poor or living near the margin enormously 
cynical about politicians and the political system, as Latinobarometer surveys indicate. 
 
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of GDP per capita rates (with 2000 PPP rates) and a country,s rating on 
the 2003 Bertelsmann's Management Index (BMI), a composite measure of the ability of a 
political system to reach agreements to solve governance problems.
22
 The simple correlation 
coefficient is —0.531, suggesting that governance and economic development are related. It also 
shows that the countries with the best political 
 
systems are the ones with the longest democratic traditions. Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay tend 
to rank very high among 116 developing countries. So does Brazil, a country with a shorter 
history of democracy. Haiti is at the other extreme. Most Latin American countries are located 
between fortieth and eightieth position, indicating that they have serious governance problems, 
though many do not fall in the category of the worst run political systems in the world. 
 
The country-specific chapters in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America 
examine both the better and the worse governed societies. Though there is no systematic 
comparison of the cases, the findings of these chapters are consistent with the BMI. The modal 
governance countries—those in the broad middle of the Bertelsmann's Index—include 
Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. Steven Levitsky surveys the 1990s in Argentina, especially on 
the political fallout from the 2002 debt default. He argues that the economic collapse had little to 
do with political causes like clientelism and corruption.
23
 Levitsky has a point. Both problems 
may be no greater than in Brazil and Mexico, and these two did not undergo a comparable crisis, 
even though Brazil (fourteenth) and Mexico (thirty-first) rank better on the BMI index than 
Argentina (forty-first). Yet Argentina could not grow itself out of its economic recession because 
its currency board, which kept the Argentine peso overvalued at one peso to one U.S. dollar, 
undermined the country's ability to export itself out of recession. Unlike Argentina, Brazil 
devalued and improved the competitiveness of its exports. The currency board itself was a 
radical solution to the lack of credibility that the Argentine political system had and still has.
24 
 
Governance is equally trying in Colombia and Peru, sixty-third and thirty-ninth on the BMI, 
respectively. Fernando Cepeda Ulloa analyzes the acceleration of civil war in Colombia during 
the 1990s. He also shows how the 1991 constitution failed to deliver on its promise to renew a 
closed, two-party system that contributed to the rise of insurgencies of the left and right. Cepeda 
Ulloa suggests that it has atomized the party system, politicized the judiciary, and brought about 
a fiscal crisis.
25
 Carlos Ivan Degregori examines the 1990s in Peru. Originally elected in 1990, 
Fujimori closed congress two years later and established an electoral authoritarian regime, in 
which periodic controlled elections were held. Degregori traces the beginning of the end of 
Fujimori's government to his declining popularity in mid 1996. Fujimori's regime rapidly disinte-
grated after videotapes showing his shadowy security chief, Valdimiro Montecinos, bribing 
congressmen surfaced in 2000.
26 
 
Brazil (fourteenth) and Chile (third) are the two relatively well governed societies covered in the 
book. Bolivar Lamounier credits Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) with developing 
quasi-parliamentary practices (using cabinet positions to cement oversized legislative coalitions) 
that improved governance in Brazil.
27
 This point is important; Brazil's image as an ungovernable 
country appears to be changing.
28
 As a result, the Brazilian political system was able to control 
inflation, reform fiscal federalism, and to begin modernize its public sector. 
 
In his chapter on Chile, Felipe Agüero shows how democracy and political consensus have 
replaced polarization and authoritarian government in the 1990s. Chile stands out not only for 
having revived and strengthened its democracy, but also for growing at an average of 6 percent 
during the 1990s. Policy consensus has also led to tax reform, the decentralization of public 
administration, judicial reform, and progress on educational and health policy. The persistence of 
what Agüero calls an "incomplete transition" made for slow progress in eliminating military 
prerogatives. The 1980 constitution, written and approved during the military dictatorship of 
General Augusto Pinochet (1973-89), created a national security council to supervise the 
political system, nonelected senators, and military autonomy to name its own leaders and secure 
sources of funding.
29
 In early 2005 (after Agüero's chapter went to press) elected officials elimi-
nated most of these authoritarian vestiges. Agüero's chapter therefore provides background on 
key developments in one of the region's success stories, even if it does not explain why 
politicians forged a broad social consensus to enact key reforms and how these reforms are 
related to impressive rates of economic growth. 
 
Mexico gets a BMI ranking of thirty-one out of 116 countries. It does better than the modal cases 
but not as well as Brazil and Chile (or Costa Rica and Uruguay). Denise Dresser's portrait of 
Mexico in the 1990s does a good job of explaining how democratization transformed the 
country's politics but has not made Mexico a much easier country to govern. She points out that 
divided government complicates governance, especially since Mexico's separation of powers 
system fragments power virtually as much as in the U.S. political system. Unlike his 
predecessors, Vicente Fox can count upon less legislative support for his bills because no party, 
including his National Action Party (PAN), holds a legislative majority. Dresser also argues that 
the only partial existence of the rule of law undermines democratic governance in Mexico. Less 
than 5 percent of crimes, for example, result in conviction and detention. This result is due not 
only to government inaction, but also to a society that tolerates widespread violation of rules and 
social norms. Both inhibit the formation of a political consensus to advance second generation 
structural reforms.
30 
 
Venezuela, examined by Michael Coppedge in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin 
America, is the worst governed country, according to the BMI. By the late 1990s the failure to 
implement structural reforms resulted in economic stagnation and the disintegration of the old 
two-party system. In this context Chavez won the presidency in 1998 (after spending time in jail 
for a failed coup attempt in 1992), gained public approval for the 1999 constitution, and was 
reelected in 2000 under the new constitution. He retains the support of enough Venezuelans, 
even as he eliminated horizontal accountability in the country's political system. Coppedge's 
point is good: whether or not one likes it, Chavez has the political support that endows him with 
the power to design a state to suit his tastes. Venezuela nevertheless gets a low BMI ranking 
(eighty-eighth) because political and policy preferences have polarized and state capacity has 
declined.
31 
 
Governance is still a huge challenge, and it might be getting more complex. The book edited by 
Dominguez and Shifter might have addressed this issue more systematically. Though each 
chapter provides essential background material on countries and issues, without a set of common 
indicators it is hard for the authors to compare governance across cases or over time. The utility 
of the concept of governance—the construction of political consensus around short- and long-
term goals and of institutions and procedures to implement them—depends upon the ability to 
identify indicators to measure its dimensions. The BMI presents the same contextual information 
as Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America but places it in a framework that 
makes it much easier to test why some societies become governable and others do not.
32 
 
Second Generation Reforms and Questions of Institutional Design 
If first generation reforms focus on macroeconomic stabilization, second generation reforms 
focus on improving the longer-term prospects for governance and economic competitiveness. 
Retiring the State asks why some governments can privatize a major government function, the 
administering old age pensions. The partial or complete privatization of pension programs 
involves the redesign of a major state responsibility and raises the question whether neoliberal 
approaches can better promote political consensus and social solidarity. Explanations of state 
effectiveness also require analysis of horizontal accountability how the parts of government 
interact to ensure that elected officials and bureaucrats do not violate the public interest and the 
central objective of the essays in Democratic Accountability in Latin America. 
 
Madrid's Retiring the State is a comprehensive study of why some governments (Bolivia, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, and Nicaragua) privatized public pension systems, 
some (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay) created private accounts to 
supplement public pension systems, and others (Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, 
Paraguay, and Venezuela) made no changes. Throughout the twentieth century Latin American 
governments established autonomous and semiautonomous bodies to administer this classic 
welfare state program. Few countries provided universal coverage; most established programs 
for public sector workers and other politically influential groups. By the late 1980s     social 
security systems included more than 70 percent of the economically active population only in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.
33 
 
Madrid uses case studies and cross-national statistical models to test different arguments about 
social security privatization. The statistical chapters evaluating the impact of financial and 
political factors unusually follow the chapter-long case studies of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. 
This way of arranging the empirical materials makes it harder to understand Madrid's overall 
argument, though this study is nevertheless a model of a solid research design. It is hard not to 
walk away impressed with the breath of scholarship in Retiring the State. 
 
Madrid argues that financial pressure and the search for domestic savings explain only a part of 
the variance between cases. If a pension system is mature, then the high costs of privatizing it 
will discourage governments from replacing publicly funded programs. If the domestic savings 
rate is low, then privatization looms as a way not only to divest government of an expensive 
social program, but also to generate capital to invest in the domestic economy. Governments 
with a legislative majority were also more likely to privatize. Another key variable was whether 
the country was the target of a World Bank pension reform mission. Each of these variables is 
significant in Madrid's probit models of eighty-two middle- and upper-income countries. 
Moreover, a regional dummy variable suggests that the Chilean model of complete pension 
privatization influenced its neighbors.
34 
 
The case studies of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil illustrate the causal dynamics behind social 
security privatization. In Mexico policymakers did not have to arrange for payment of an overly 
mature system. In the mid 1990s the Mexican pension system for private sector workers was still 
basically solvent, despite problems with contribution evasion over the years and the inability of 
past social security fund administrators to invest surpluses for the future. As a share of public 
pension spending, it was only 0.4 percent of GDP in 1996. Zedillo's party also held a large 
majority in Mexico's bicameral congress, a condition that, Madrid argues, is fundamental in 
explaining why Mexico privatized so many pension systems. Finally, neoliberal economists held 
sway. The administration was headed by a Yale-trained economist who believed that 
privatization of a large and typically inefficient state could only help the Mexican political 
economy. 
 
In Argentina and Brazil wholesale privatization did not occur because most of these conditions 
were absent. As a share of public spending, pensions accounted for 6.2 percent of GDP in 
Argentina and 4.9 percent in Brazil in the mid 1990s. Any effort to privatize public pensions 
would have generated large transition costs, despite the efforts of influential neoliberal 
economists to champion the virtues of the Chilean model. Though Menem's administration held 
a majority in the Argentine legislature, Cardoso's in Brazil did not. Even Menem had to water 
down the bills he originally sent to the legislature because Peronist labor unions, formally part of 
the same Justicialista Party, balked at privatizing old age pensions. 
 
Madrid's findings are important for several reasons. First, economic crisis, as measured by 
inflation or recession, does not lead to pension reform. Unlike first generation reforms, these 
reforms have diffuse long-term benefits and costs. Second, each of the case studies reveals that a 
key interest group in developed societies—pensioners themselves—was not a relevant player in 
pension privatization politics in Latin America. Only when pension system members belonged to 
powerful labor unions (Argentina) or public sector unions (Brazil and Mexico) did technopols 
have to modify pension privatization bills. In Mexico highly organized public sector unions, 
whose members receive pensions out of all proportion to members' contributions, have thus far 
prevented reform of their pension systems.
35
 The failure to reform these public pension systems, 
in fact, raises doubts about whether Mexico is a case of privatization. Third, the regional dummy 
variable picks up not only diffusion of the Chilean model, but also, with one partial exception, 
serious governance problems. None of the cases of pension privatization—including Bolivia, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru—gets impressive marks from the BMI. 
Though the BMI gives Chile a high rating by 2003, its ranking would probably have been 
substantially lower in 1981, when its military government radically changed its old age pension 
system. Public pensions systems were often part and parcel of rickety states that required (and 
still require) extensive reform. Technocrats, in fact, favor privatization because public pension 
systems are often rife with corruption, suffer from contribution evasion, and concentrate 
benefits—often out of central state revenues—in urban-based sectors. While it is fair to criticize 
pension privatization for reducing social solidarity, it is very much the case that public pension 
systems in many parts of Latin America were badly run and economically regressive.
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Nevertheless, it is not clear that privatization has delivered or will deliver all of its alleged 
benefits. It has not had a noticeable positive effect on domestic savings rates. Madrid points out 
that it is debatable whether the investment boom after privatization in Chile stemmed principally 
from this factor. Rates of evasion still remain worryingly high. According to a World Bank 
study, only about one-half of the economically active population is contributing to a pension 
system, whether public or private.
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 Lack of coverage may very well prompt electoral demands 
for the return of government-sponsored retirement schemes. Indeed, by 2001 Argentine central 
state politicians succeeded in getting fund managers to transfer private pension funds to central 
state coffers or to state banks. And once the Argentine economy crashed, the government simply 
stopped paying interest on these loans and slashed worker's contributions from 11 to 5 percent of 
their wages. 
 
That the Argentine central government could raid private pension benefits to cover its 
expenditures suggests that checks and balances are not working in this country. Of course, this 
conclusion presupposes that the Argentine constitutional design, or the design of any presidential 
system, encourages the parts of government to check each other. Explaining how the branches of 
government stay accountable to voters as well as to other parts of the state is the central concern 
of Mainwaring and Welna's Democratic Accountability in Latin America. While half of the 
chapters map the conceptual terrain of accountability, the other half examines the performance of 
several institutions of horizontal accountability in selected countries. 
 
Democratic Accountability in Latin America pivots around Guillermo O'Donnell's influential 
discussion of what he has termed horizontal accountability. According to O'Donnell, horizontal 
accountability is "the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and 
factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions 
or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that 
may be qualified as unlawful."
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 O'Donnell's point is that state institutions in Latin America are 
not very effective in curtailing the arbitrariness of executive authority. The legislature and the 
judiciary do not balance against the executive very well. Mandated institutions like comptroller 
generalships, ombudsmen, and the like are not very good in protecting against the abuse of 
power or in preventing corruption. 
 
In their contribution, Erika Moreno, Brian Crisp, and Matthew Shugart dispute the usefulness of 
this conceptualization. They argue that accountability is a principal-agent relationship. There can 
be no accountability between horizontally equal institutions. They conclude that horizontal 
accountability does not exist because public prosecutors, attorneys general, and comptrollerships, 
to name a few agencies, often do not or can not sanction elected officials, much less fire them. 
For these authors, the only accountability that exists in democracies is vertical. If the state 
violates rights and engages in corruption, it is because the relations of authority between voters 
and their servants are not working well.
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Democratic Accountability in Latin America is interesting because the thinking of James 
Madison pervades so many of the contributions. Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart explicitly draw on 
Madison to frame their discussion. If the trick, to paraphrase Madison, is to make the state 
accountable and effective, then many Latin Americans, they hypothesize, get bad government 
not because the institutions of horizontal exchange are inoperative, but because vertical 
accountability does not work. Latin American electoral systems fragment parties and make 
deputies little more than purveyors of favors to narrow constituencies or create centralized and 
unresponsive parties. Either way, this process discourages deputies (and senators in bicameral 
systems) from becoming interested in policy and making the legislature an effective overseer of 
executive and bureaucratic activities. 
 
Vertical accountability may be improving in some Latin American countries. In his chapter in 
Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, Carey points out that several 
developments are opening up democratic politics. First, a few countries—including Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia (after Carey's chapter went to press), Peru, and Venezuela—have reformed 
their constitutions to allow presidents to seek reelection and thus let electorates decide to reward 
or punish incumbents. Second, parties in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay 
now hold primaries to select presidential candidates. Both measures empower electorates to 
make more choices and thus make elected officials more responsive to public opinion. Third, 
legislative transparency has gotten better in some countries. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Peru now make roll call votes available (in whole or in part); citizens and 
watchdog groups can thus monitor the behavior of their representatives. Whether the countries 
that have democratized the most produce legislators who more actively police the bureaucracy is 
a hypothesis worth testing. It also goes to the heart of the dispute about whether dysfunctional 
states are a product of failures of vertical or horizontal accountability. 
 
Regardless of one's position in the debate between O'Donnell and his critics, these conceptual 
chapters raise questions about institutional design. They build upon and mark an important point 
of departure from ongoing debates about executive-legislative relations. If this relationship is 
crucial for regime survival, then it becomes important to test theories about its impact on the 
code law that governs the way the bureaucracy, both in and outside of the executive, works. 
Analysis of how bureaucracies do or do not work will help show why many Latin American 
political systems are not promoting democratic governance. Moreover, analysis of the politics of 
institutional design will determine whether second-rate public bureaucracies contribute to 
interbranch conflict. After all, it is not uncommon to witness a reform-minded executive, one 
who claims to embody the national will, confront a legislature because it will not enact his 
program to reverse the accumulated effects of lawmaking on bureaucracies and the agencies of 
horizontal exchange. 
 
It takes an uncommon combination of political conditions and institutional factors to create 
democratic accountability. The rarity of this combination may explain why democratic 
governance has not improved in very many countries of the region. Scott Morgenstern and Luigi 
Manzetti compare Argentine and U.S. political development to identify the conditions for the 
development of horizontal accountability. They conclude that public outcry for reform, along 
with divided government, encouraged career-minded legislators to develop accountability 
institutions to check the power of the executive in the U.S. These conditions were absent in 
Argentina until the 1990s.
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It is not clear that constitutional framers and institutional reformers in Latin America have sought 
to borrow from Madison. The checks and balances version of the separation of powers makes 
two or more parts of government responsible for every function of government, based on the 
presupposition that shared responsibilities prevent tyranny. Although the 1853 Argentine and the 
1857 (and even 1917) Mexican constitutions echo central themes of U.S. constitutional design, 
the Costa Rican and Uruguayan constitutional traditions, for example, do not. These 
constitutions seek to overcome the incessant conflict among the branches of government through 
functional specialization. Each part of government takes responsibility for one function of 
government. The establishment of autonomous electoral court systems throughout the twentieth 
century is one of the best examples of this type of statecraft. Though classical constitutional 
theory made the executive responsible for organizing elections and empowered the legislature to 
certify election results, the theory of functional specialization entrusts all electoral functions to 
independent agencies and courts. Electoral courts and other autonomous agencies therefore strike 
at the heart of the checks and balances version of the separation of powers.
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The development of the decentralized state sector, one formally outside of the central state that 
often includes health care, old age pensions, and monetary policy, remains an important part of 
the Latin American institutional landscape. Indeed, the best governed states in Latin America—
Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay—create bureaucratic agencies largely outside of the central state 
to protect them from the partisan bickering of the elected branches of government. Only Chile 
privatized its pension system. Instead, Costa Rica and Uruguay chose to establish individual 
retirement accounts, as Madrid explains, to supplement public systems that autonomous insti-
tutes continue to administer. Is a new separation of powers that allocates each function of 
government to an agency of the state a better or alternative route in promoting democratic 
accountability? 
 
In her chapter on the effectiveness of the Brazilian legislature in exercising oversight, Argelina 
Cheibub Figueiredo makes the point that Madison may not be the best inspiration to make sense 
of horizontal accountability. Precisely because legislative majorities have formed coalitions to 
support the executive, in exchange for cabinet portfolios and other benefits, they can not 
effectively oversee the executive. In this institutional schema, horizontal agencies become vital 
ways of ringing the alarm bells when public officials violate the law.
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Conclusion: Future Research Directions 
The books under review raise fundamental issues about structural reform, democratic 
governance, and institutional design and offer significant findings. Several of them underscore 
the importance of public opinion in explaining the ebb and flow of structural reform. Weyland's 
The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies borrows from prospect theory to explain 
that some presidents and voters endorsed orthodox economic reforms because they were in the 
domain of losses, that is, they believed that severe economic crises required drastic policy 
measures. An implication of Weyland's argument is that support for radical reform is temporary. 
Once economic conditions improve, voters may perceive themselves to be in the domain of gains 
and therefore become reluctant to back additional reforms. 
 
One promising area for research, then, is to explore political attitudes toward economic reform 
and the political system. Weyland suggests that macroeconomic and democratic stability turns 
voters into supporters of the status quo. An implication of Susan Stokes's argument in Mandates 
and Democracy is that the constituency in favor of neoliberal reform is contracting because 
democratic elections are becoming increasingly competitive. Unlike Weyland, she does not focus 
on the cognitive constraints that voters face in backing or opposing market reforms because she 
has a more rationalistic conception of voters. While it is unsure if Stokes believes that voters are 
singularly retrospective, she does think that citizens will punish incumbents for betraying 
promises not to implement the Washington consensus. While Stokes and Weyland's arguments 
may be complementary, it is worth testing them against each other to explain the ebb and flow of 
market-friendly reforms. 
 
Both of these arguments raise the issue why so many citizens in the region are suspicious of 
anything that smacks of market reform. Eduardo Lora and Mauricio Olivera suggest that Latin 
Americans have a general aversion to such reforms. Even politicians that reduce inflation only 
break even after discounting for the negative effects of being labeled neoliberals. Political 
scientists need to examine the psychology of antiliberal behavior and to locate its class, cultural, 
and electoral sources. Convincing voters to endorse reforms that seem to enrich a small segment 
of the population is not easy to do in societies with the highest rates of inequality in the world. 
For voters in economically uncertain situations, the promise of incremental improvements in 
some distant future is not enough to overcome the suspicion that such reforms serve only to 
maintain income disparities. The overall ill repute of the political system, as Marta Lagos and 
others reveal, also undermines the ability of politicians to make credible commitments about the 
future benefits of economic policy. With a handful of exceptions, politicians in Latin America 
are therefore unable to gain electoral support for reforms that economists say will promote 
economic development. 
 
These books also point out that second generation reforms do not have much of a future, even if 
the newfound consensus in favor of macroeconomic and democratic stability sticks.
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 Madrid 
argues in Retiring the State that only extraordinary political conditions (for example, executive 
control of the legislature) and economic conditions (for example, relatively low financial costs) 
empowered neoliberal economists to convince their governments to privatize their pension 
systems. The first condition is becoming uncommon with time, even if many second generation 
reforms (for example, labor reforms, additional privatizations, and legal and democratic reforms) 
do not generate as many financial costs upfront. Single party majority governments became a 
distinct minority between 1984 and the end of the 1990s. By 2000 more than 70 percent of all 
governments relied upon coalitions of parties in the legislature.
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The rise of coalition government in most presidential systems and its impact on governance since 
the 1980s also requires explanation. If a virtue of presidentialism is that it promotes executive 
stability, then it is worth noting that recent research suggests that cabinets do not appear to be 
any less stable in parliamentary systems.
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 Related research shows that presidents, like prime 
ministers, consciously make cabinet appointments as part of their overall legislative strategy.
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There may also be nothing new about what some call the "parliamentarization" of executive 
authority in Latin America. An earlier generation of research on Latin American political 
systems noted this parliamentarization, but it was lost with the turn to dictatorship during the 
1960s and 1970s.
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To determine whether the return of coalition cabinets helps or hinders governance, it is necessary 
to devise cross-national measures of this multidimensional concept. The BMI is an ambitious 
effort to code 116 developing countries on political inclusiveness, implementation of interparty 
reform agreements, and a host of related factors. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
also has underwritten a multiyear project to link the institutional features of a dozen Latin 
American governments with key characteristics of their policymaking regimes.
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 Systematic 
analysis of governance not only can chart progress, but also can test hypotheses about the way 
institutional frameworks and systems of representation interact to push countries into more 
advanced and self-sustaining development trajectories. 
 
Finally, the books under review explore the impact of institutional design on democratic 
governance. The way different parts of the state are structured shapes the incentives for public 
officials to become accountable and therefore to promote democratic governance. The 
preliminary diagnosis in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna's Democratic Accountability 
in Latin America is that horizontal accountability, or the effectiveness of checks and balances 
among the organs and agencies of the state, does not work very well in Latin America. 
O'Donnell suggests that the relations between the agencies of state government do not encourage 
them to supervise each other and therefore to advance the public interest. Moreno, Crisp, and 
Shugart suggest that better systems of representation would activate the checks and balances in 
separation of powers systems. 
 
Again, systematic tests of these alternative arguments are needed to determine what institutional 
design best promotes democratic accountability in separation of powers systems. For all of the 
talk of horizontal accountability, there are very few tests of how alternative principal-agent 
models improve the responsiveness of state officials. There is a reasonably large number of 
works on how Congress delegates authority to the bureaucracy and even some work on why 
presidents and Congress sometimes create independent agencies and some times do not.
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Unfortunately, researchers have not yet developed criteria to measure the degree of autonomy of 
agencies from the executive or from the legislature. It stands to reason that the most continuously 
democratic countries should have the most responsive bureaucracies. Yet the use of the new 
separation of powers in so many countries suggests that mechanisms of horizontal accountability 
are key to explaining why the quality of bureaucratic services tends to be higher in Costa Rica, 
Chile, and Uruguay. 
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